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ARBITRATING ESTOPPEL: EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL IN ARBITRATION CONTRACTS 
NICHOLAS OLESKI∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The Sixth Circuit and the district courts within the circuit have held that non-
signatories to arbitration contracts may be compelled to arbitrate under the Federal 
Arbitration Act—even though they are not signatories to the arbitration contract. 
These courts reason that the non-signatories must arbitrate their claims because of an 
equitable estoppel theory. Although the Federal Arbitration Act displaces most state 
law regarding arbitration, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts must use 
state contract law to determine who is bound by an arbitration contract. This Note 
examines state contract law in the Sixth Circuit on equitable estoppel and concludes 
that the Sixth Circuit’s equitable estoppel theory is not based on state law.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The primary advantage of arbitration,1 or any form of alternative dispute 
resolution, is that it allows willing parties to settle disputes without resorting to the 
                                                            
 
∗ J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, May 2016. Special thanks to Professor 
Sandra Kerber for her advice and guidance throughout law school. I would also like to thank 
my parents for their love and support with this endeavor, and more. 
 1  Defined as a “term for a range of dispute resolution processes involving the referral of a 
dispute to an impartial third party who, after giving the parties an opportunity to present their 
evidence and arguments renders a determination in settlement of the dispute.” Kevin A. 
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courts. But imagine being subjected to arbitration by a party with whom you never 
agreed to arbitrate. It would mean, in essence, involuntarily waiving your Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial;2 it would mean subjecting yourself to a closeted and 
closed quasi-judicial practice with little chance of appeal, all of which tend to favor 
business organizations—not the individual.3 Under an equitable estoppel theory 
promulgated by several circuits4 and adopted by courts in the Sixth Circuit,5 you 
could be forced to arbitrate against your will. 
Consider the following hypothetical of Pat, Dan, and Tim. Pat and Dan enter into 
an employment contract containing an arbitration clause. Tim, Pat’s archenemy, 
convinces Dan that Pat will not be as good an employee and that Dan should hire 
him instead. Dan then breaches his contract with Pat by firing him and hiring Tim. 
Subsequently, Pat files a tort action against Tim alleging contractual interference. In 
the ensuing litigation, Tim seeks to use the arbitration clause in Pat’s employment 
contract to compel arbitration. 
Under the equitable estoppel doctrine adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in MS 
Dealer v. Franklin,6 Tim would probably be successful in obtaining a stay of the 
litigation and compelling arbitration. In the hypothetical, Pat is a signatory7 litigant, 
Tim is a non-signatory litigant, and Dan is a signatory non-litigant. Pat’s complaint 
is based on a contract containing an arbitration clause, and he is alleging 
interdependent and concerted misconduct between Tim and Dan (i.e., they conspired 
together to breach Pat’s employment contract). Thus, although Tim was not a party 
                                                            
Sullivan, The Problems of Permitting Expanded Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 509 (2002) (quoting DICTIONARY OF 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 28, 33 (Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999)). 
 2  See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, 
and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1997); see also Jean R. Sternlight, 
Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury 
Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate 
Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L. 
Q. 637 (1996) [hereinafter Sternlight, Panacea]; Nima H. Mohebbi, Note, Back Door 
Arbitration: Why Allowing Nonsignatories to Unfairly Utilize Arbitration Clauses May 
Violate the Seventh Amendment, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 555, 557 (2010). 
 3  See Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: 
A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1241-42 (2001). 
 4  See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2000); MS 
Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 5  See, e.g., Liedtke v. Frank, 437 F. Supp. 2d 696 (N.D. Ohio 2006); Javitch v. First 
Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 6  MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947 (noting that equitable estoppel allowing a non-signatory to 
compel arbitration arises when: (1) the signatory to a written agreement must rely on the terms 
of the agreement in asserting her claims; and (2) when the signatory alleges substantially 
interdependent and concerted misconduct between both the non-signatory and another of the 
signatories). 
 7  This Note uses the term “signatory” to refer to a person who was an explicit party to a 
contract containing an arbitration clause. In contrast, “non-signatory” will refer to a person 
who was not a party to a contract containing an arbitration clause.  
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to the original contract, he could still enforce the arbitration clause and compel 
arbitration. 
Of course, there is nothing especially unusual about allowing a third party to 
enforce a contract.8 What is unusual about MS Dealer is that its equitable estoppel 
analysis is not based on any traditional estoppel or contract theories.9 Nonetheless, as 
the Supreme Court has noted with some frequency, arbitration is a matter of state 
contract law.10 Further, the Court has provided some guidance on how courts should 
analyze such situations when it held that a non-party to an arbitration agreement has 
standing to compel arbitration “if the relevant state contract law allows him to 
enforce the agreement.”11 
This Note will argue that the Sixth Circuit should overrule its decision in Javitch 
v. First Union and only allow a non-signatory to compel arbitration under an 
equitable estoppel theory when the relevant state estoppel law is satisfied. As such, 
Part I will provide an historical overview of arbitration law. Part II will survey the 
case law that developed around MS Dealer and the equitable estoppel doctrine in 
general. Part III will study the Sixth Circuit states’ application of equitable estoppel. 
And Part IV will examine how MS Dealer and Javitch’s equitable estoppel doctrine 
does not satisfy state estoppel laws.  
I. THE ORIGINS OF ARBITRATION LAW IN AMERICA 
Prior to the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925,12 American 
courts, following English jurisprudence, refused to enforce arbitration agreements.13 
Judicial hostility to arbitration agreements ultimately gave rise to the passage of the 
FAA.14 This fact is crucial to understanding both the federal pro-arbitration policy 
and the current preference of many courts for arbitration instead of litigation—even 
when maintaining that preference may be inequitable. 
                                                            
 8  The most common methods for allowing a non-party to enforce a contract include 
agency law, third-party-beneficiary principles, and equitable estoppel. MS Dealer, 177 F. 3d at 
947; see also Frank Z. LaForge, Note, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory 
Defendants Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 230 (2005) (discussing 
these principles). 
 9  See infra Part III & IV; see also LaForge, supra note 8, at 240. 
 10  See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987). 
 11  Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 632. 
 12  9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
 13  Sternlight, Panacea, supra note 2, at 644 (noting that parties could agree to arbitrate 
only after a dispute arose—not before). 
 14  Id. at 645-46. 
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A. Brief History of European and English Arbitration 
The collapse of the Roman Empire completely halted commercial activity in 
Europe.15 Subsequently, a decentralized system of regional interaction, particularly 
with respect to trade, developed.16 Agricultural improvements in the eleventh 
century, however, enabled societies to sustain growing populations.17 As a result, 
population boomed and people began migrating to urban areas, where a new class of 
merchants emerged.18 In order to facilitate trade, these merchants, who traded with 
other merchants living in distant cities,19 developed the law merchant, an informal 
body of law that reflected the merchants’ customs and shared legal notions.20 When 
disputes arose, merchants utilized private arbitrators rather than common-law judges 
because “arbitrators were merchants who had expertise in the relevant trade and 
were familiar with business norms and industry practices.”21 
For centuries, arbitration remained the primary method for resolving commercial 
disputes.22 Common-law judges in England, however, eventually became concerned 
that arbitration served as an end run around the legal system and that arbitration 
would weaken the English courts.23 Accordingly, English judges became hostile to 
arbitration clauses and refused to enforce them in contracts.24 This policy enabled a 
party to revoke, up until the arbitrator made her decision, her agreement to submit 
                                                            
 15  See JAMES W. ERMATINGER, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 68 (2004) 
(chronicling the history of the Roman Empire’s collapse and its effect on increased regional 
interaction). 
 16  Id. 
 17  See Peter T. Leeson, One More Time With Feeling: The Law Merchant, Arbitration, 
and International Trade, 2007 INDIAN J. OF ECON. & BUS. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 29, 30 (discussing 
development of merchant classes that followed from increased agricultural production and 
urban migration). 
 18  Id. 
 19  Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of 
Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 
449, 460 (1996). Instead of becoming traveling salespersons, though, merchants organized 
“fairs” where they met and engaged in trade with one another. Id. 
 20  Leeson, supra note 17, at 30. 
 21  Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous 
Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and A Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 793 
(2002); see also Cole, supra note 19, at 459 (examining a merchant’s understanding of the 
common-law system). 
 22  Cole, supra note 19, at 461. 
 23  Id. (“Eventually, however, common law judges became concerned that the merchants’ 
ability to systematically circumvent common law court procedures by agreeing to submit their 
disputes to arbitration had resulted in a reduction of the judges’ salaries.”) (citing Kill v. 
Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 352, 1 Wils. 129 (1746)). 
 24  Id. at 462. Professor Cole suggests that the judges’ self-interested rationale “was that 
the increased use of arbitration had diminished judges’ salaries because the amount a judge 
was paid depended on the number of cases he heard.” Id. at 461-62 (citing Scott v. Avery, 25 
L.J. Ex. 308, 313, 111 Rev. Rep. 392 (H.L. 1856)). 
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the controversy to arbitration.25 This became known as the doctrine of revocability26 
and remained the law in England for nearly 300 years.27 Finally, in 1889, the English 
Parliament sounded the death knell for the revocability doctrine with the enactment 
of the Arbitration Act.28 This change in English law is said to have prompted the 
movement in the United States to reform arbitration law.29 Whatever ultimately 
prompted the change in American arbitration law, it was clear that change would 
have to come via the legislature, as in England, because the American judiciary 
proved unwilling to make such a dramatic change in the law.30 
B. A Brief Overview of American Arbitration Prior to the FAA 
For the most part, the development of arbitration in America was influenced by 
the English common-law tradition.31 Indeed, American courts used a variety of 
rationales, some borrowed from the English common law, to refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements.32 Even in the early part of the twentieth century, many states 
                                                            
 25  Margaret M. Harding, The Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the 
Appropriateness of Arbitration As A Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397, 426 
(1998). This, of course, led to abuse; a party would revoke her submission to arbitrate if she 
believed the arbitrator was going to rule against her. Id. at 426 n.188 (citing Bills to Make 
Valid and Enforceable Written Provisions or Agreements For Arbitration of Disputes Arising 
Out of Contracts, Maritime Transactions or Commerce Among the States or Territories or 
with Foreign Nations: Joint Hearings on S. 1005 and H.R. 646 Before the Subcomms. of the 
Comms. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1924) (statement of Julius Henry 
Cohen, Member of the Committee on Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law of the 
American Bar Association and General Counsel for the New York State Chamber of 
Commerce)). 
 26  See Vynior’s Case, 8 Co. Rep. 80a , 81b (1609) (establishing the doctrine). 
 27  Harding, supra note 25, at 429. 
 28  IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW 27 (1992); Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, 
§§ 1-110 (Eng.). 
 29  MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 27. 
 30  See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924) (“The courts have felt that the precedent was 
too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment, although they have 
frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results 
from it.”); see also U.S. Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 
(S.D.N.Y. 1915) (criticizing the doctrine of revocability, but nonetheless declining to enforce 
an arbitration agreement). 
 31  See Pittman, supra note 21, at 797; see also Harding, supra note 25, at 426 (1998). At 
least one commentator, however, notes that American courts were even more hostile toward 
arbitration than their English counterparts. Cole, supra note 19, at 464 n.68. 
 32  See Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“agreements [made] 
in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void”); Tobey 
v. County of Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1321 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (“[Arbitrators] are not 
ordinarily well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to administer either 
effectually, in complicated cases; and hence it has often been said, that the judgment of 
arbitrators is but rusticum judicium”); Wood v. Humphrey, 114 Mass. 185, 186 (1873) (“It has 
been long settled that agreements to arbitrate which entirely oust the courts of jurisdiction will 
not be supported at law or in equity”). 
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continued to pass laws that limited the scope of arbitration agreements—in spite of 
the commercial desire and need for laws enforcing arbitration agreements.33 
Nevertheless, businessmen increasingly turned to arbitration as government 
regulation of the economy increased during the Progressive Era.34 These 
businessmen found respite from government regulation by arbitrating their disputes 
to solve their own problems “without resort to the clumsy and heavy hand of 
[g]overnment.”35 Unlike judges or juries, “arbitrators confine themselves to their 
specialty, that of passing on technical questions of fact in modern business.”36 This 
proved crucial in increasing the desirability of arbitration as the complexities of new 
business disputes led to an overtaxed judiciary whose procedures were inflexible and 
whose laws tended to be obsolete.37 
Lobbying efforts ramped up during the 1910s to change American arbitration law 
and ensure that arbitration agreements would be enforced.38 New York became the 
first state to codify a statute guaranteeing that courts would specifically enforce 
arbitration agreements.39 Julius Henry Cohen, a leading proponent of the New York 
law, argued that a legally enforceable arbitration clause demonstrated New York’s 
public policy “toward adjusting trade difficulties out of court and thus preserving the 
good relations between the parties, while securing a fair and reasonable adjustment 
of the controversy in hand.”40 With businessmen and lawyers side by side, the effort 
to end judicial hostility to arbitration and place such agreements on the “same 
footing as other contracts”41 could not fail. In 1925, Congress passed the FAA, 
which made arbitration agreements irrevocable and enforceable.42 
C. The FAA and the Federal Presumption Toward Arbitration 
The background provided above is critical to understanding the climate in which 
the FAA was passed and how courts interpreted and understood the FAA 
subsequently.43 After espousing such hostility toward arbitration agreements, courts, 
                                                            
 33  Paul L. Sayre, Development of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 595 
(1928). Sayre’s article, somewhat ironically, pleads that Congress should look to English law 
and its arbitration reforms to address commercial concerns. See id. at 596. 
 34  JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW? 101 (1983).  
 35  Id.  
 36  Sayre, supra note 33, at 615. 
 37  Cole, supra note 19, at 465. 
 38  MACNEIL, supra note 28, at 28-29. 
 39  FRANCES A. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION: ITS HISTORY, FUNCTIONS AND 
ACHIEVEMENTS 10 (1948). 
 40  Julius Henry Cohen, The Law of Commercial Arbitration and the New York Statute, 31 
YALE L.J. 147, 152 (1921) (noting as well the statute’s “efficacy as a preventive of 
unnecessary and burdensome litigation is as demonstrable as that sanitation is a preventive of 
disease.”). 
 41  H.R. Rep. No. 68-96, at 1 (1924). 
 42  Cole, supra note 19, at 466. 
 43  Another point of emphasis is that the FAA was passed when Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 
Pet.) 1 (1842), was still good law. Because the rules governing arbitration were considered 
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in the wake of the FAA, found that it “establishes that, as a matter of federal law, 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language 
itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.”44 
1. Current Law Regarding Arbitration Agreements 
Today, whether or not a particular matter is subject to arbitration is a matter of 
contract law.45 Thus, the key question in determining the enforceability of an 
arbitration clause is whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the issue or 
dispute.46 Even in light of the federal presumption to arbitrate, courts will not 
enforce an arbitration clause that goes beyond the plain meaning or intent of the 
parties just to satisfy the policy of favoring arbitration.47 “Arbitration under the 
[FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion.”48 
The federal presumption favoring arbitration continued to expand as the Supreme 
Court interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws at variance with the FAA.49 Thus, 
even if the parties file an action in state court to enforce an arbitration agreement, the 
state court must apply the FAA if it is implicated.50 Still, ordinary state-law 
                                                            
procedural rather than substantive, federal courts sitting in diversity would not apply state 
arbitration statutes, thus creating an additional need for a federal statute. Christopher R. 
Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 126 (2002).   
 44  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); see 
also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (“it has 
been established that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption 
of arbitrability”); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 583 (1960) (“Doubts should be resolved in favor of [arbitration].”). 
 45  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995). 
 46  See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) (“we look first to whether 
the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, not to general policy goals, to determine the scope of 
the agreement”); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 
(1967) (“the purpose of Congress in 1925 was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable 
as other contracts, but not more so”). 
 47  Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294. 
 48  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989). 
 49  See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984); cf. Kenneth F. Dunham, Sailing 
Around Erie: The Emergence of a Federal General Common Law of Arbitration, 6 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 197, 199 (2006) (discussing the alternative interpretations offered by Southland’s 
critics as well as its supporters). Although state law is utilized to determine whether the parties 
actually agreed to arbitrate, there is now a body of federal substantive law regarding almost 
every other aspect of arbitration. Id. at 202 (citing Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Elecs., 
Inc., 828 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)). As one commenter notes, “for all practical purposes, 
state law has been ousted from the arbitration arena by coupling the FAA with the Commerce 
Clause.” Id. at 202. 
 50  Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 15. But see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 286-88 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress, when it passed the 
FAA, did not consider it to be applicable in state courts due to the fact that Swift v. Tyson was 
still good law); see also Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 
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principles regarding contract formation are used to decide whether the parties agreed 
to arbitrate a given issue.51 Indeed, section 2 of the FAA prescribes that written 
arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”52 Thus, the 
FAA does not displace state law—either common law or statutory law—that applies 
to all contracts; rather, the FAA precludes “the States from singling out arbitration 
provisions for suspect status.”53 
2. The Supreme Court and Equitable Estoppel 
In 2009, the Supreme Court issued an opinion captioned Arthur Andersen LLP v. 
Carlisle, which confirmed the primacy of state contract law in assessing agreements 
to arbitrate.54 After they sold their construction-equipment company, Wayne 
Carlisle, James Bushman, and Gary Strassel (“plaintiffs”) were introduced to 
Bricolage Capital as well as several law firms by their auditor Arthur Andersen.55 On 
the advice of these advisors, the plaintiffs engaged in a complicated tax shelter plan 
designed to create illusory losses.56 As part of this plan, plaintiffs formed several 
limited liability companies, which subsequently entered into investment 
management agreements with Bricolage.57 These agreements contained an 
arbitration clause.58 
“As with all that seems too good to be true, a controversy did indeed arise.”59 
The investments the plaintiffs made were worthless, and the IRS found the tax 
shelter to be illegal.60 The plaintiffs filed suit in federal court against the defendants, 
Bricolage Capital and Arthur Anderson, alleging fraud (among other claims).61 The 
defendants62 moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration under an equitable 
                                                            
56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233, 249 (2008) (arguing that the FAA “was meant to merely serve as a 
gap-filler in a system in which the assertion of judicial jurisdiction was controlled by Swift v. 
Tyson”). 
 51  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (citing Mastrobuono v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63, n.9 (1995), Volt Info., 489 U.S. at 475-76, 
and Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492-93 n.9 (1987)). 
 52  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 53  Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996); see also Sherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511 (1974) (noting that arbitration clauses are 
indistinguishable from contracts). 
 54  Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009). 
 55  Id. at 626. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 
 58  Id. 
 59  Id.  
 60  Id. 
 61  Id. at 627. 
 62  Barring Bricolage, which filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 627 n.2. 
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estoppel argument.63 The district court rejected this argument and denied their stay.64 
Subsequently, the defendants appealed to the Sixth Circuit, which held that because 
the arbitration agreement was not in writing, it did not have jurisdiction to hear the 
appeal.65 
Although the Supreme Court did not directly address how federal courts should 
interpret equitable estoppel in the context of an agreement to arbitrate,66 it confirmed 
some background principles, and its dicta suggests that federal courts turn to state 
law when confronted with a non-signatory seeking to compel arbitration.67 Indeed, 
the Court was quite explicit that the FAA does not alter any state contract laws 
regarding the scope of agreements, “including the question of who is bound by 
them.”68 Thus, it was error for the Sixth Circuit to hold that non-signatories are, by 
definition, barred from § 3 relief; that question must be answered with reference to 
state law.69 The Court was explicit that when the lower courts are confronted with a 
non-signatory seeking to enforce an arbitration clause, the courts must look to state 
contract law to determine if the non-signatory can compel arbitration.70 
                                                            
 63  Id. at 627. 
 64  Carlisle v. Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, LLP, 521 F.3d 597, 598 (6th Cir. 
2008), rev’d sub nom. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624 (2009). 
 65  Id. Section 16(a)(1) of the FAA permits that, “[a]n appeal may be taken from an order 
refusing a stay of any action under section 3.” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1) (2012). Section 3 prescribes 
that a federal court shall issue a stay of the litigation if the issue is “referable to arbitration 
under an agreement made in writing for such arbitration.” Id. § 3 (emphasis added). The Sixth 
Circuit “read the plain language” of the FAA to “preclude appellate jurisdiction” because 
there was not an agreement in writing between the parties; there were agreements in writing 
between defendants and the limited liability companies, but not between the plaintiffs or 
defendants. Carlisle, 521 F.3d at 602; see also In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practice 
Litig. v. Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P., 428 F.3d 940, 944-45 (10th Cir. 2005); DSMC Inc. v. 
Convera Corp., 349 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (both agreeing with the reasoning of the Sixth 
Circuit). But see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 478 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2007) (disagreeing with 
the Sixth Circuit and holding that the claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the 
arbitration clause, which meets the writing requirement of the FAA). 
 66  The issues before the Court were “whether appellate courts have jurisdiction under § 
16(a) [of the FAA] to review denials of stays requested by litigants who were not parties to the 
relevant arbitration agreement, and whether § 3 can ever mandate a stay in such 
circumstances.” Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 625-26. The Court held that a non-signatory 
could invoke § 3 “if the relevant state contract law allows him to enforce the agreement.” Id. 
at 632. 
 67  See id. But see Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 568 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion vastly expands the scope of the FAA). 
 68  Arthur Andersen, 556 U.S. at 630. 
 69  Id. at 631 (citing 21 R. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACT § 57:19, p. 183 (4th ed. 2001)). 
 70  Id. But see id. at 633 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that FAA should be read to offer a 
§ 3 stay only to signatories of the contract); see also Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 568.  
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II. EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
Given that a valid contract requires mutual consent, a non-signatory cannot, as a 
general rule, compel a signatory to arbitrate.71 Nevertheless, courts have recognized 
that non-signatories may be bound to an arbitration agreement under ordinary 
contract and agency law principles.72 The Sixth Circuit has recognized five theories 
for binding the non-signatory: (1) incorporation by reference, (2) assumption, (3) 
agency, (4) veil-piercing/alter ego, and (5) equitable estoppel.73 This article will 
focus on the equitable estoppel theory and examine how courts have used this theory 
to compel arbitration between parties who never actually agreed to arbitrate. 
A. MS Dealer v. Franklin 
In MS Dealer v. Franklin, the plaintiff, Sharon Franklin, entered into a contract 
to purchase a car from the defendant-car dealership.74 The contract also included a 
third-party service contract with MS Dealer, a non-signatory to the underlying 
agreement.75 The plaintiff sued both MS Dealer and the auto dealership after she 
discovered several defects in the car; she alleged fraud, breach of contract, 
conspiracy, and breach of warranty.76 MS Dealer sought to use the arbitration clause 
contained in the contract77 to compel arbitration. Even though MS Dealer was not a 
signatory to the contract containing the arbitration clause, the Eleventh Circuit held 
that MS Dealer could compel arbitration under an equitable estoppel theory.78 In 
                                                            
 71  See AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (“[A] 
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to 
submit.”) (quoting United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 582 (1960)). 
 72  See Arnold v. Arnold Corp., 920 F.2d 1269, 1281 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 73  Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Thomson-
CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995)). 
 74  MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 75  Id. 
 76  Id. 
 77  The arbitration provision provided: “BUYER HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGES AND 
AGREES THAT ALL DISPUTES AND CONTROVERSIES OF EVERY KIND AND 
NATURE BETWEEN BUYER AND JIM BURKE MOTORS, INC. ARISING OUT OF OR 
IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OF THIS VEHICLE WILL BE RESOLVED 
BY ARBITRATION.” Id. 
 78  Id. Courts often note a distinction between a non-signatory seeking to compel 
arbitration against a signatory and a signatory seeking to compel arbitration against a non-
signatory. See Thomson-CSF, 64 F.3d at 779 (noting that courts will estop a signatory from 
avoiding arbitration but will not estop a non-signatory from avoiding arbitration when the 
benefit being sought on the contract is only indirect). The Thomson court justified the 
distinction by arguing that when a non-signatory compels a signatory, the signatory has 
indicated a willingness to arbitrate—albeit not with the party compelling arbitration. Id. Since 
arbitration, however, is based on the consent of the parties—something the Thomson court 
concedes—the distinction is meaningless; if the parties did not agree to arbitrate with one 
another, then arbitration can never be compelled—unless some other contract theory demands 
it. 
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doing so, the court delineated two different circumstances where existing case law 
allowed a non-signatory to compel arbitration using equitable estoppel: (1) when the 
signatory to a written contract with an arbitration clause must rely on the terms of 
contract in asserting her claims against the non-signatory;79 and (2) when the 
signatory raises allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted 
misconduct by both the non-signatory and one or more of the signatories.”80     
The MS Dealer court held that both circumstances applied and compelled 
arbitration.81 Although the plaintiff did not allege that the service contract had been 
violated in any way, each of her fraud and conspiracy claims depended entirely on 
her contractual obligations.82 The second circumstance was met because the plaintiff 
alleged that MS Dealer and the auto dealership engaged in a fraudulent scheme 
together.83 After holding the plaintiff equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration, 
the court did not determine whether MS Dealer could compel arbitration under either 
an agency or third-party beneficiary theory.84 
The Eleventh Circuit later recognized that MS Dealer was abrogated by Arthur 
Andersen LLP v. Carlisle by noting that, “state law governs whether an arbitration 
clause is enforceable against a nonsignatory under the FAA.”85 Nevertheless, the 
court compelled arbitration against a non-signatory because the non-signatory’s 
claim was “inextricably intertwined” with his claims against the signatory.86 
Although this analysis is probably insufficient under most state estoppel laws,87 the 
court justified its holding by citing to a Florida state court that adopted MS Dealer’s 
equitable estoppel analysis.88 Thus, the court recognized the abrogation yet still 
                                                            
 79  MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947 (citing Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc. 
10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993)). 
 80  Id. (quoting Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc. 981 F. Supp. 1423, 1433 (M.D. Ala. 
1997)). These two “circumstances” eventually became two prongs of one test. See, e.g., In re 
Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 975 (11th Cir. 2002), rev’d on other 
grounds sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003). 
 81  MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947. 
 82  Id. at 948. The court noted that although the plaintiff attempted to sound her complaint 
against MS Dealer in tort (i.e., fraud and conspiracy), those claims depended entirely upon her 
contractual obligation to pay for the service contract. Id. at 948 n.4.  
 83  Id. But cf. Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 535 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(Dennis, dissenting) (arguing that the contract was ambiguous and it would not be 
unreasonable to construe it to include MS Dealer as one of the parties to it, thus obviating the 
need to resort to an equitable estoppel theory to compel arbitration). 
 84  MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 948. 
 85  Escobal v. Celebration Cruise Operator, Inc., 482 F. App’x 475, 476 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 86  Id. 
 87  See infra Parts III & IV; see also In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract & Bus. 
Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 328 (Fla. 2013) (providing that equitable estoppel is established when 
a party took action, which another party relied on in good faith to her detriment); Major 
League Baseball v. Morsani, 790 So. 2d 1071, 1076 (Fla. 2001) (an estoppel arises where a 
party “willfully cause[s] another to believe in the existence of a certain state of things, and 
thereby induces him to act on this belief injuriously to himself.”). 
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followed MS Dealer’s reasoning because it found that MS Dealer was incorporated 
into Florida’s contract law.89 
B. Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc. 
The Sixth Circuit continued to demonstrate the federal policy favoring arbitration 
when it vacated the district court’s denial of a signatory’s motion to compel 
arbitration against a non-signatory in Javitch v. First Union Securities, Inc.90 The 
plaintiff, Victor Javitch, was appointed as receiver for VES and CFL91 to oversee 
and administer their business and assets for the benefit of all their creditors, 
investors, and owners.92 Under this authority, Javitch brought claims against First 
Union Securities, Charles Schwab, Fifth Third, and several of each firm’s individual 
brokers.93 Each complaint averred negligence, negligent supervision, breach of 
fiduciary duty, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, RICO violations, aiding and abetting 
violations of federal securities laws, and conversion.94 Each defendant sought to 
compel arbitration because VES and CFL, when they opened brokerage accounts at 
the defendant-firms, entered into binding arbitration agreements as part of the 
customary consumer contract.95 
The defendants argued that even though Javitch, as the receiver, did not enter 
into an arbitration agreement, he should nevertheless be compelled to arbitrate 
because the broker-customer relationship on which he based his claims would not 
exist but for the agreements containing the arbitration clause.96 This is thus an 
inverse of the MS Dealer scenario, where a non-signatory defendant attempts to 
compel a signatory plaintiff to arbitrate; in Javitch, signatory defendants sought to 
compel a non-signatory plaintiff to arbitrate. As such, the court used the Second 
Circuit’s equitable estoppel analysis in Thomson-CSF v. American Arbitration 
Association, which held that a non-signatory could only be compelled to arbitrate 
when she “seeks a direct benefit from the contract while disavowing the arbitration 
                                                            
 88  Escobal, 482 F. App’x at 476 n.3 (citing Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So. 3d 
965, 969 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)). 
 89  However, this is circular logic. The Eleventh Circuit realized that Supreme Court 
precedent foreclosed complete reliance on MS Dealer, unless it was based on state contract 
law. But the Eleventh Circuit still applied MS Dealer because a Florida state court relied on its 
reasoning before the Eleventh Circuit realized that MS Dealer was abrogated. 
 90  315 F.3d 619, 622 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 91  Javitch was judicially appointed after it was alleged, in a separate case, that James 
Capwill and entities he controlled, including VES and CFL, defrauded funding companies and 
investors. Id. at 621. 
 92  Id. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. at 622. 
 95  Id. at 623. 
 96  Id. at 628-29. The court noted that each claim rested on the duties defendants owed 
VES and CFL. Id. at 622. 
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provision.”97 Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court for 
further fact finding on whether Javitch sought a direct benefit from the customer 
agreements.98 
On remand, the district court stayed the litigation in favor of arbitration under an 
equitable estoppel theory.99 The district court specifically noted that Javitch “cannot 
both seek to benefit in this suit from the relationships created by those agreements, 
while disavowing the arbitration provisions.”100 
The Sixth Circuit has yet to address the equitable estoppel scenario raised in MS 
Dealer and several other prominent cases,101 but the district courts within the circuit 
have seen and decided these issues. For example, in Cox v. ScreeningOne, Inc.,102 
Wise v. Zwicker & Associates, PC,103 Villanueva v. Barcroft,104 Simpson v. LifeNet, 
Inc.,105 Eaves-Leanos v. Assurant, Inc.,106 and Liedtke v. Frank,107 the district courts 
adopted the equitable estoppel analysis of MS Dealer. Thus, a question arises as to 
whether MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel is recognized by state contract laws within 
the Sixth Circuit. 
III. SIXTH CIRCUIT STATE LAW ON EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
As seen above, agreements to arbitrate are interpreted in light of state-law 
contract principles.108 Although the FAA and its subsequent case law created a body 
of federal substantive law governing arbitrability (i.e., whether a given dispute or 
                                                            
 97  Id. at 778-79. When only an indirect benefit is sought, the non-signatory may not be 
compelled to arbitrate; if a signatory sought only an indirect benefit, she, of course, could be 
compelled to arbitrate (assuming the requirements of MS Dealer are met). Id. 
 98  Javitch, 315 F.3d at 629. This direct versus indirect benefit analysis seems similar to 
the first prong of MS Dealer, requiring that signatory rely on the terms of a written contract 
when asserting her claims. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 
1999); see also Int’l Paper Co. v. Schwabedissen Maschinen & Anlagen, 206 F.3d 411, 418 
(4th Cir. 2000) (“[A] party may be estopped from asserting that the lack of his signature on a 
written contract precludes enforcement of the contract's arbitration clause when he has 
consistently maintained that other provisions of the same contract should be enforced to 
benefit him”). 
 99  Javitch v. First Union Sec., No. 3:01 CV 780, 2011 WL 665727, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 
15, 2011). 
 100  Id. 
 101  For a detailed analysis of one particularly eccentric case, which has, as its author notes, 
“it all: rags-to-riches Hollywood success stories, celebrity superstars, chainsaw massacres, 
duplicitous movie executives,” and equitable estoppel, see LaForge, supra note 8, at 233. 
 102  No. 4:14-CV-229, 2015 WL 413812, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2015). 
 103  No. 5:12-CV-01653, 2013 WL 1195555, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 22, 2013). 
 104  822 F. Supp. 2d 726, 739 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (applying MS Dealer in the context of a 
forum selection clause). 
 105  No. 09-12228-BC, 2010 WL 86328, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 5, 2010). 
 106  No. 3:07-CV-18-S, 2008 WL 1805394, at *2-3 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 21, 2008). 
 107  437 F. Supp. 2d 696, 699 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 108  First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). 
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contract is subject to arbitration), state law is used to determine whether or not the 
parties agreed to arbitrate.109 The following section examines the state of equitable 
estoppel in each state within the Sixth Circuit and analyzes whether such laws are 
consistent with the approach adopted by courts within the Sixth Circuit. 
A. Kentucky 
In Kentucky,  
The essential elements of equitable estoppel are[:] (1) conduct which 
amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at 
least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are 
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently 
attempts to assert; (2) the intention, or at least the expectation, that such 
conduct shall be acted upon by, or influence, the other party or other 
persons; and (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. And, 
broadly speaking, as related to the party claiming the estoppel, the 
essential elements are (1) lack of knowledge and of the means of 
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance, in good 
faith, upon the conduct or statements of the party to be estopped; and (3) 
action or inaction based thereon of such a character as to change the 
position or status of the party claiming the estoppel, to his injury, 
detriment, or prejudice.110 
In Sebastian, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the plaintiff could not 
equitably estop a zoning board from denying his zoning plan—even though it had a 
long history of prior approvals.111 Indeed, the slow pace of development, over a four-
decade stretch, showed that the plaintiff’s actions (or inactions) were directly related 
to the slow pace of development—not the actions of the board; his actions were not 
induced by any reliance on a representation made by the zoning board.112 Further, 
the long delay created a foreseeable possibility that not only zoning regulations 
might change, but also the attitude of the zoning board.113 The crux of this holding is 
that a plaintiff must innocently rely to her detriment on some false representation. 
B. Michigan 
Michigan requires that one who seeks to invoke equitable estoppel must establish 
that there has been: “(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact, (2) 
an expectation that the other party will rely on the misconduct, and (3) knowledge of 
                                                            
 109  Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Elecs., Inc. 828 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). The 
notion that there is a body of federal common law regarding arbitration is highly controversial, 
with critics claiming that this violates the Erie Doctrine. Dunham, supra note 49, at 199 
(summarizing the arguments of both critics and supporters).  
 110  Sebastian-Voor Properties, LLC v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 265 S.W.3d 
190, 194-95 (Ky. 2008); see also Weiand v. Bd. of Trs. of Ky. Ret. Sys., 25 S.W.3d 88, 91 
(Ky. 2000); Elec. & Water Plant Bd. of Frankfort v. Suburban Acres Dev., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 
489, 491 (Ky. 1974). 
 111  Sebastian, 265 S.W.3d at 194. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
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the actual facts on the part of the representing or concealing party.”114 Although 
Michigan courts utilize their equitable powers, such powers are reserved for 
extraordinary circumstances.115 Indeed, Michigan’s Supreme Court has been 
unwilling to find an estoppel unless there has been intentional or negligent 
conduct.116 
In Cincinnati Insurance, Michigan’s Supreme Court allowed the plaintiff to estop 
the defendant from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense.117 In a 
subrogation dispute between two insurance agencies, the court found that the 
plaintiff delayed bringing litigation “at the request of [the defendant].”118 This fact, 
coupled with ample evidence showing that the defendant represented that the 
subrogation claim would be processed quickly, justified the plaintiff in relying on 
the defendant’s representations.119 Similar to Kentucky’s equitable estoppel, 
Michigan essentially requires that a party make a misrepresentation, on which the 
other party detrimentally relies. 
C. Ohio 
The principle that underscores Ohio’s gloss on equitable estoppel “is to prevent 
actual or constructive fraud and to promote the ends of justice.”120 Similar to 
Kentucky and Michigan, Ohio bases its doctrine on detrimental reliance.121 An 
estoppel arises where one has been innocently misled into an injurious position,122 or 
where one party induces another to believe certain things and the other party 
reasonably relies on the misrepresentation to her detriment.123 
In Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, the court found that the defendants could 
not be equitably estopped from asserting the statute of limitations as a defense to the 
plaintiff’s claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress and breach of fiduciary 
duty (among others).124 The plaintiff alleged that she had a sexual relationship, 
                                                            
 114  Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Citizens Ins. Co., 562 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Mich. 1997). 
 115  Flynn v. Korneffel, 547 N.W.2d 249 (Mich. 1996). 
 116  Cincinnati Ins., 562 N.W.2d at 651 (citing Lothian v. Detroit, 324 N.W.2d 9 (Mich. 
1982)); see also Devillers v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n, 702 N.W.2d 539, n.64 (Mich. 2005); Solo 
v. Chrysler Corp., 292 N.W.2d 438 (Mich. 1980). 
 117  Cincinnati Ins., 562 N.W.2d at 652. 
 118  Id. at 651. 
 119  Id. at 652. The court further notes, ipso facto, the fact that the defendant “did not intend 
to honor its representations is demonstrated by the fact that it did not honor them.” Id.  
 120  Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990). 
 121  Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ohio 2008) (quoting 
McAfferty v. Conover’s Lessee, 7 Ohio St. 99, 105 (1857) (“[A] party will be concluded from 
denying his own acts or admissions, which were designed to influence the conduct of another, 
and did so influence, and when such denial will operate to the injury of the latter”)). 
 122  Russell v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 131 N.E. 726, 733 (Ohio 1921). 
 123  State ex rel. Chavis v. Sycamore City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. 641 N.E.2d 188, 193 
(Ohio 1994). 
 124  Doe, 880 N.E.2d at 893. 
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which gave rise to her claims, with a priest some forty years prior to the litigation.125 
She further alleged that the priest and a nurse persuaded her that she must “suffer in 
silence.”126 Nevertheless, the court held that the only facts relevant to her equitable 
estoppel argument would be any allegations that the Archdiocese tried to prevent her 
from timely filing suit.127 Indeed, the court reaffirmed that the purpose of equitable 
estoppel is to prevent fraud, and here, none of the plaintiff’s allegations provided any 
indication that the plaintiff was duped into not filing suit.128 A common thread 
linking these states together is the requirement that the party seeking an estoppel 
must detrimentally rely on a statement or misrepresentation of the other party. 
D. Tennessee 
According to Tennessee, equitable estoppel arose from the maxim that no person 
may take advantage of her own wrong.129 To assert a viable equitable estoppel 
argument, a party must establish that she was induced to follow an injurious course 
by her opponent, who knew, or reasonably should have known, that such 
inducements would cause injury.130 Importantly, this doctrine only applies where 
“the opposing party ha[s] engaged in misconduct.”131 Accordingly, each Sixth 
Circuit state requires some form of misconduct and detrimental reliance on that 
misconduct. The next section examines whether the equitable estoppel theories 
espoused by MS Dealer and Javitch have any root in the traditional state-law 
estoppel doctrines. 
IV. INEQUITABLE ESTOPPEL 
A. The Inequities of MS Dealer 
The most obvious problem with MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel argument is that 
the parties never agreed to arbitrate their dispute. Indeed, the focus is on esoteric 
interpretations of the signatory’s claims—rather than any theory of contractual 
consent.132 Moreover, as discussed below, equity is not offended if a court refuses to 
compel arbitration on behalf of a non-signatory against a signatory. Instead, it would 
                                                            
 125  Id. 
 126  Id.  
 127  Id. at 895. 
 128  Id. 
 129  Richardson v. Snipes, 330 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting 1 HENRY 
R. GIBSON, GIBSON’S SUITS IN CHANCERY § 60 pg. 74 (5th ed. 1955)). 
 130  Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese of Memphis, 363 S.W.3d 436, 460 (Tenn. 
2012); see also Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. v. Epperson, 284 S.W.3d 303, 315-16 
(Tenn. 2009) (listing the elements of equitable estoppel: (1) conduct that amounts to a false 
representation, (2) intention that such conduct will be acted upon, and (3) knowledge of the 
real facts). 
 131  Norton v. Everhart, 895 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tenn. 1995). 
 132  Again this consent does not have to be explicit. There are many vehicles, such as 
agency law and third-party beneficiary principles, that are firmly footed in contract law that 
may provide a method for compelling arbitration in the MS Dealer scenario. MS Dealer’s 
equitable estoppel theory is not one of those vehicles. 
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seem that equity would in fact demand the non-enforcement of the arbitration clause 
because enforcing it effectively nullifies the signatory’s constitutional right to civil 
court.133   
As an initial matter, it is possible that MS Dealer’s first prong, requiring that 
signatory must rely on the terms of the contract in asserting her claims against the 
non-signatory,134 could comply with traditional estoppel theories in that by asserting 
a claim against a non-signatory, the signatory is making an implicit 
misrepresentation.135 In essence, the first prong requires the signatory to make 
contradictory statements/claims; she is attempting to hold the non-signatory liable 
based on the terms of the contract while denying or ignoring the arbitration clause 
contained therein.136 This, however, seems to misunderstand the purpose behind 
equitable estoppel: preventing wrongdoers from profiting from their wrongdoing.137 
The focus should be on the wrongful or fraudulent conduct of a party, upon which 
equity prevents that party from profiting;138 under MS Dealer, the focus is on the 
abstract interpretations of the signatory’s claims (i.e., whether or not the claims are 
inextricably intertwined with the contract)—not the signatory’s conduct toward the 
non-signatory.139   
The crux of this is that MS Dealer’s first prong requires a court to focus on the 
claims of the signatory—not her conduct. As an example, consider the facts of MS 
Dealer itself.140 Recall that the first prong was met because the plaintiff’s claims 
made reference to and assumed the existence of a written contract.141 But there is 
nothing about her conduct that might give rise to an estoppel. Indeed, courts 
generally require that some representation be made.142 Almost by definition, then, 
there must be some contact or conduct between the parties. MS Dealer, however, 
focuses solely upon claim construction and interpretation—not the conduct of the 
                                                            
 133  See sources cited supra note 2. Professor Sternlight has been one the chief critics 
against binding arbitration—especially in so far as it infringes on a litigant’s Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial. 
 134  MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 135  See Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 574. 
 136  See LaForge, supra note 8, at 244. 
 137  See, e.g., Ohio State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Frantz, 555 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ohio 1990); 
Richardson v. Snipes, 330 S.W.2d 381, 390 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1959) (quoting GIBSON, supra 
note 129, at § 60 pg. 74). 
 138  See David K. Thompson, Equitable Estoppel of the Government, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 
551, 551 (1979). 
 139  LaForge, supra note 8, at 241. 
 140  See supra Part II.A. 
 141  MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 142  See, e.g., Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 935 (1986) (“An essential element of any 
estoppel is detrimental reliance on the adverse party's misrepresentations”); WILLISTON ON 
CONTRACTS § 8:3 (4th ed.) (“[I]t is generally held that a representation of past or existing fact 
made to a party who relies upon it reasonably may not thereafter be denied by the party 
making the representation if permitting the denial would result in injury or damage to the 
party who so relies.”). 
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parties. Indeed, the facts of MS Dealer are unclear as to what, if any, relationship the 
parties had with one another because the court was not concerned with any contact 
the two may have had prior to the filing of the claim.143 But surely there cannot be a 
contractual relationship absent any interaction.  
The second prong of MS Dealer, which requires a signatory’s claims raise 
allegations of “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by both the 
non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the contract”),144 is equally 
problematic in its distortion of equitable estoppel. As one commentator argues, the 
second prong “contains no requirement that the action against the nonsignatory relate 
in any way to the agreement containing the arbitration provision, instead allowing 
the nonsignatory to take advantage of the provision if it makes allegations of 
‘substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct.’”145 Indeed, the second 
prong is problematic for the opposite reason the first is problematic: this prong is all 
about misconduct—but not the kind state law requires in equitable estoppel.146 In 
this scenario, a court is rewarding the non-signatory wrongdoer who conspired with 
a signatory to injure the putative plaintiff. Equity should, in fact, demand that the 
opposite result be reached. 
Although there are some nuances and differences between them, Sixth Circuit 
states generally require two elements for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to apply: 
(1) the estopped party makes some kind of misrepresentation; and (2) the other party 
to have detrimentally relied on that misrepresentation.147 Even if both prongs of MS 
Dealer are satisfied, there still would no estoppel because there is no relationship 
between the parties that evinces any kind of detrimental reliance.148 If the parties 
never interact, there can never be any misrepresentation on which the other party can 
rely. Any interaction between the parties in these arbitration scenarios occurs only 
                                                            
 143  It may well be true that compelling arbitration was the correct decision in MS Dealer. 
But not on estoppel grounds. Indeed, one judge even argued that MS Dealer and the plaintiff 
“actually manifested their mutual assent to a bargain in which they exchanged promises of 
performance with each other.” Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 536 
(5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, dissenting). However, the Eleventh Circuit, by holding that the 
plaintiff was equitably estopped from avoiding arbitration, refused to consider any other 
theory of enforcing the arbitration clause. MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 948 (“[W]e need not 
determine whether MS Dealer could enforce arbitration under an agency theory or a third-
party-beneficiary theory.”). 
 144  MS Dealer, 177 F.3d at 947. 
 145  Christopher Driskill, Note, A Dangerous Doctrine: The Case Against Using Concerted-
Misconduct Estoppel to Compel Arbitration, 60 ALA. L. REV. 443, 453 (2009). 
 146  Eventually the Eleventh Circuit required a party to satisfy both parts of the MS Dealer 
test to permit a non-signatory from compelling arbitration, id. at 455 (discussing In re 
Humana, Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 (11th Cir. 2002)), but many courts have 
neglected to impose such a restraint, see Mohebbi, supra note 2, at 575 n.136 (discussing 
those cases). 
 147  See supra Part III. 
 148  See, e.g., Doe v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 880 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ohio 2008) (noting 
that plaintiff never alleged to be in contact or to have been contacted by the defendants; thus 
her equitable estoppel claim must fail because she failed to allege any misrepresentation). 
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when the plaintiff files her claims. For example, in Liedtke v. Frank,149 the plaintiff 
received a credit card from Household Bank; after she amassed debt on the card, the 
bank hired a law firm to run a credit inquiry and collect the debt.150 The plaintiff 
filed suit alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act,151 and the defendant 
law firm sought to compel arbitration under the plaintiff’s contract with the bank.152 
The only interaction between the parties, and thus the only possible 
misrepresentation, was when the plaintiff filed her claim in court. As a result, the 
misrepresentation and the reliance occurred simultaneously, whereas traditional 
estoppel law presumes a temporal element.153 This temporal element is essential 
because without it there is no detrimental reliance.154 
At its most basic level, equitable estoppel is about equity and fairness.155 The 
crux of the argument against MS Dealer’s equitable estoppel is that it is inequitable. 
The Eleventh Circuit focuses its analysis on only one of the parties’ claims or 
conduct—rather than the traditional considerations of the conduct of both parties.156 
Absent this kind of reciprocal relationship (of a misrepresentation followed by 
detrimental reliance), it cannot be said that parties ever, either expressly or 
impliedly, had an agreement to arbitrate.157 Without such an agreement, a court 
cannot compel arbitration in light of Supreme Court precedent.158 
Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit and its courts should abandon any of their 
equitable estoppel precedents that rely on MS Dealer because, in contravention of 
Supreme Court precedent, these cases are not founded on or based on state law. Only 
where a party can show, at a minimum, a misrepresentation followed by detrimental 
reliance will an equitable estoppel arise.  
B. The Inequities of Javitch 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit should apply the same equitable estoppel standard 
when reviewing motions to compel arbitration under Javitch v. First Union. Even 
though Javitch presents the inverse of MS Dealer (i.e., a signatory is attempting to 
                                                            
 149  437 F. Supp. 2d 696 (N.D. Ohio 2006). 
 150  Id. at 697. 
 151  15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012). 
 152  Liedtke, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 698. 
 153  LaForge, supra note 8, at 249.  
 154  Indeed, a party cannot assert that she detrimentally relied on another party’s 
misrepresentation before the misrepresentation was made. 
 155  Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, LLC. 210 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 156  If A represented to B that she would be getting the same contract as C, whose contract 
contained an arbitration clause, it is only equitable that A be estopped from denying the 
arbitration clause. B relied to her detriment on A’s representation that the contract would be 
identical to C’s. 
 157  One of the frustrating things about the case law is that the courts never analyze how a 
non-signatory could be held liable under the terms of the contract. See Grigson, 210 F.3d at 
533 (Dennis, dissenting) (suggesting that in MS Dealer both the signatory and the non-
signatory actually manifested consent to arbitration); see also LaForge, supra note 8, at 252. 
 158  See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 280 (2002).  
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compel arbitration against a non-signatory),159 the same considerations apply: only 
where there has been misrepresentation followed by detrimental reliance will 
equitable estoppel apply. The court’s distinction160 between a non-signatory seeking 
a direct benefit from a contract containing an arbitration clause and the same non-
signatory seeking an indirect benefit is inapposite to state estoppel laws. Once more, 
the court is only addressing the conduct of one of the parties, ignoring state law 
requiring a relationship between the conduct and the resulting harm. 
As explained above, this focus on a party’s claims rather than her conduct 
completely confuses the issues at hand. Indeed, this approach effectively confuses 
the actual parties to the controversy by treating the case as one between two 
signatories to the arbitration contract.161 By requiring that the non-signatory seek a 
direct benefit from the contract, the court is, in essence, attempting to ascertain 
whether the contract is implicated; the logic of this being the two signatories who 
actually made the contract agreed to arbitrate all claims the arose under the 
contract—regardless of whether the claims were being litigated by a signatory or a 
non-signatory.162 The inevitable consequence of this logic would be to “bind both 
parties to arbitrate their contract-related claims against the world-at-large, not just 
each other.”163 Of course, as discussed above, arbitration is a matter of contract and 
consent;164 two parties are free to contract away their right to civil court, but such an 
agreement cannot, as a basic tenant of contract law, bind anyone outside of that 
agreement. 
Thus it is immaterial, as a matter of contract law, whether the benefit being 
sought by the non-signatory plaintiff in regards to the contract is direct or indirect. 
What matters is consent. Similarly, there is no indication in Javitch that the parties 
ever interacted prior to the commencement of the lawsuit.165 As a result, there cannot 
have been any sort of misrepresentation that might have given rise to an estoppel; 
without a misrepresentation, it is impossible to have detrimental reliance.166 Even 
though, the signatory defendants did agree to arbitrate issues that arose under the 
contract, they did not agree with the non-signatory plaintiff.  
To examine these principles, let us return to our hypothetical of Pat, Dan, and 
Tim. Now, Dan sells a car to Tim; the sales contract contains an arbitration clause. 
                                                            
 159  Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 160  This distinction is drawn from Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 64 F.3d 773, 
776 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 161  LaForge, supra note 8, at 242-43. 
 162  This type of circular logic is most likely a result of the pro-arbitration dogma that 
pervades federal courts. 
 163  Id. at 245. 
 164  See, e.g., Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009); EEOC v. Waffle 
House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002); First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 
944 (1995); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987). 
 165  Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 628 (6th Cir. 2003). The defendants all 
had contact or a relationship with the entities placed in receivership, but they did not have any 
interaction with the receiver, Victor Javitch. Id. Again, there may be some other contractual 
theory that might compel arbitration, but not equitable estoppel. 
 166  Or, at least, reasonable detrimental reliance. 
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Subsequently, Dan sells another car to Pat and knowingly misleads Pat that his 
contract contains an arbitration clause like Tim’s. If Dan subsequently instigates 
litigation against Pat alleging breach of contract, Pat, under the state law estoppel 
theories discussed above, may be successful in staying the litigation and compelling 
arbitration—even though the parties did not mutually agree to arbitrate. But here, 
equity would demand arbitration. Dan made a material misrepresentation that Pat 
relied on to his detriment;167 Dan would thus be estopped from denying he 
represented to Pat that Pat’s contract would have an arbitration clause.168 
Importantly, the inverse of this hypothetical would not justify an estoppel; that is, 
if Dan attempted to compel arbitration. After all, it was Dan who made the material 
misrepresentation, and he should not be permitted to profit from his malfeasance. It 
is only the party that detrimentally relied on the misrepresentation who can be 
granted an estoppel. Thus it is immaterial what Dan’s claims are,169 all that matters is 
that Dan made a misrepresentation upon which Pat detrimentally relied. 
As such, the Sixth Circuit should overturn its decision in Javitch and treat the 
inverse MS Dealer situation the same as any other equitable estoppel claim. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal policy favoring arbitration is strong, but even that strong policy does 
not force parties to arbitrate when they have not agreed to arbitrate.170 In order to 
determine whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate, courts turn to ordinary state 
contract law.171 State laws within the Sixth Circuit require, at a minimum, both a 
misrepresentation and detrimental reliance for a party to assert an equitable estoppel 
argument.172 Thus, Sixth Circuit case law at variance with this equitable estoppel 
definition is both inequitable and at odds with Supreme Court precedent.  
  
                                                            
 167  Note that this is a simplified hypothetical and that each state’s estoppel laws are more 
nuanced and would need to be explored in greater depth to determine precisely when an 
estoppel would lie. 
 168  As the Supreme Court has noted, “he who by his language or conduct leads another to 
do what he would not otherwise have done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by 
disappointing the expectations upon which he acted.” Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 
580 (1879). 
 169  Not entirely, to be fair. Pat would only be entitled to an estoppel based upon the 
misrepresentation. Thus he could not compel arbitration against any and all of Dan’s claims—
just the ones that would have been subject to arbitration if Dan had been truthful. 
 170  See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 293 (2002). 
 171  Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631 (2009). 
 172  See supra Part III. 
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